Speakers discuss that everyone matters in shaping policy and outcomes, examining tools and approaches that help ordinary people influence decisions that affect their lives.
At Davos 2026, Hélène Landemore and Nobel laureate Oliver Hart argued that rebuilding legitimacy in democracies and capitalism requires putting ordinary people closer to real decisions. Landemore warned that “dialogue has become a dying practice” amid polarization and an “oligarchic drift” driven by elections that “systematically oversample the wealthy, the connected, the charismatic.” Her alternative, “open democracy” or “politics without politicians,” centers deliberation by randomly selected citizens through civic lotteries: “one person, one lottery ticket.” Citizens’ assemblies—paid, supported with childcare, and advised by experts “on tap, not on top”—have already delivered results, from Ireland’s abortion and marriage equality reforms to France’s climate convention. Hart extended the logic to markets, arguing shareholders don’t simply want profit maximization. Using ExxonMobil’s climate lobbying as an example, he noted companies claim to act for shareholders but “it never asks us what we want.” He proposed “investor assemblies” run by asset managers like BlackRock to guide voting and engagement on tradeoffs where expertise informs but cannot decide: executives are “not…chosen for their ability to make moral choices.” Both speakers framed assemblies as a scalable infrastructure that improves problem-solving, reduces free-riding, and restores trust by giving people dignity, voice, and accountability in the systems that govern them.
All right. Hello, everyone. My name is Ravi Agrawal. I'm the editor in chief of Foreign Policy magazine and the host of FP live. And it's a real pleasure to be here to moderate this session for you. We have a fantastic topic today. It's called We Are All Decision Makers. And by the way, I also want to welcome our global audience watching this and listening to this from all over the world. The topic we are all decision makers might sound like it is almost making fun of us. Because are we really decision makers? Do you all feel that way? Does democracy allow us to feel that way? Do we really have decision making capability on who gets to govern us, on how our pension funds are used, on how infrastructure is built in the cities and towns and countries we live in? I don't know, the jury might be out. If you look at polling on trust in the media, on trust in governments, poll after poll suggests that trust is declining, hope and faith are declining, and it really is a great moment to step back, I think, and to consider, you know, what does democracy mean? Are we doing it right? Are there tweaks and adaptations that we should be considering? And not just in democracies, but elsewhere as well? Are we looking enough at outcomes or just at forms of government? And amidst all of this, our citizens being forgotten? So in the next 30 minutes, I have two fantastic speakers for you. They are both going to step up here and make short presentations. And then we are going to assemble together and have some Q&A. And I'm going to bring you in. Especially given this topic, it would be ironic if I didn't involve you, our citizen assembly in the audience in the discussion. So please have a think about any questions you would like to put to our guests. Our two guests are Ellen Landymore, who is a professor at Yale. She's written fantastic books such as Open Democracy and Politics Without Politicians, which is, we've got several copies at the back there, which I hope you'll be able to pick up and maybe get signed by her at the end. And we also have Sir Oliver Hart, who is a Nobel Prize winner in economics for his work on contract theory. Also exploring, how businesses and humans interact, in a day to day basis. So without further ado, I'm going to first invite Ellen on stage to to make her presentation, then Sir Oliver, and then a bit of Q&A. So let's hear it for Ellen, please.
Thank you Ravi. Thank you everyone for for being here. So a spirit of dialogue that is the theme of Davos 2026. Talk about wishful thinking. My Mark Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada, pointed out just a few days ago that we are moving back towards great power politics. Right. That means we're moving back away from dialogue towards the rule of the stronger arbitrariness. We know how that ends at the very end of that trajectory, you have things like what's going on in Iran at the moment, where the government is meeting peaceful protesters with machine guns and medieval cruelty. But the problem is not just geopolitical, it's also domestic. In our own so-called advanced democracies, dialogue has become a dying practice. Political opponents in the US, but also in my native France, don't talk to each other anymore. Don't respect each other anymore, won't marry each other, and they certainly won't solve problems together. Additionally, wherever there is still some amount of dialogue, that dialogue is not inclusive enough. There are too few voices in the room that matter. That's a big problem if we're going to avoid the dangers of authoritarianism and the temptation of populism, because this kind of elitism fuels exactly this kind of temptations. My field, political science, actually actually shows that the current system in our elected democracies, electoral democracies, politicians are overly responsive to the preferences and interests of the affluent at the expense of everyone else. So voices are missing clearly in the rooms where decision making is taking place. In my view, this polarization of the landscape and this oligarchic drift have the same source code. The design flow is in the way we're reinventing democracy in the 18th century by centering elections. You might say, what are you talking about? Aren't elections the very core definition of democracy? No, actually, they are. Historically, an oligarchic selection mechanism will systematically oversample the wealthy, the connected, the charismatic, the already powerful. So they tend to power, unsurprisingly, a narrow slice of the population that will tend to rule for people like them. Look at the American Congress. Is it a representative sample of the larger population? Elections not only reduces the pool of voices represented at the top, but they also encourage division and polarization. Because you're more successful as a politician, if you enrage your voters and breed contempt for the opposite camp. This is, by the way, not a moral judgment on politicians, some of whom are very nice people. This is an observation about incentives and selection effects. It's also a reminder that many of us at this meeting in this room are operating within systems that concentrate real power in the hands of a few, and that includes myself. I work at Yale. It's also an elite institution. So what's the alternative? In my work, I describe a different democratic architecture. I call it open democracy. Or more provocatively, in this forthcoming book, Politics Without Politicians. Instead of centering elections and professional politicians, I propose that we center ordinary citizens in all their diversity, including the people I call the shy, the people who would never run for election, who would never win an election and yet have things to say and matter. So this is not and this is a common misunderstanding, direct democracy. It's not mass voting or plebiscites in the Swiss vein, actually, since we're in Switzerland, although I do believe in these mechanisms as very much complementary to what I'm talking about. But what I'm talking about is actually deliberative rule by representatives selected through civic lotteries, according to a very simple democratic principle. One person, one lottery ticket, which for me embodies the principle of political equality. This idea is not new. We don't have to reinvent the wheel. It was practiced. It was the core of ancient democracy. In classical Athens. And it was later used as well in the Italian republics for anti-corruption purposes. Today we still have a an example of it in the criminal juries in the UK and in the US, where we entrust ordinary people with life and death decisions. So what does politics without politicians look like today? In practice, they look like juries on steroids. They look like citizens assemblies. Citizens assemblies are large, randomly selected group of ordinary citizens convened for a sustained period of time, sometimes months, to deliberate about policy issues from abortion to climate to urban planning. They are paid for their time. They're reimbursed for their expenses, including daycare. They hear from experts, of course, but experts in these settings are on tap, not on top. They give advice. They do not decide. We decide there are no parties, no campaigns, no careers at stake, no revolving doors at the end, when you're done, you go back home. This may sound utopian, but it's not. The OECD has documented close to a thousand examples of such citizens assemblies worldwide. So it's not a democratic experiment at this point. It's a democratic infrastructure information, which we can scale from the local to the global. And it delivers, it delivers results. So the Irish Citizens Assemblies helped Ireland pass landmark legislation on abortion and marriage equality in France. The climate convention paved the way for the most ambitious climate law we've ever had the climate, the climate and resilience law. But importantly, these citizens assemblies do not just solve problems, they reconcile people with themselves, with each other, with politics. In the classical classic example is the Citizens Convention on Marriage Equality, where a person could describe themselves as homophobic actually ended up supporting the rights of gay people to marry whomever they like. So assemblies are both tools for collective problem solving and reconciliation. Through dialogue, they can help governments regain both efficiency and legitimacy. Let me conclude. The real question is whether this is feasible. It's it's how far we want to take this. If citizens can help politicians address issues in politics, could they also help corporations, institutions and global organizations, including maybe the do the same? To answer this question, it is my honor to now give the floor to Nobel Prize winning economist Oliver Hart.
Thank you very much, Ellen. So what I'm going to I'm going to talk about and this is joint work with Ellen and Luigi Zingales from the University of Chicago. What we have worked on is whether this idea can be applied in the investment context. In particular, is an investor's assembly a way for companies to learn what their shareholders want them to be doing? Now, some people, when they hear this, their first reaction is, what are you talking about? We don't need this because we already know what shareholders want. They want companies to maximize profit or shareholder value. And this is indeed the conventional wisdom, very deeply entrenched. But as Luigi Zingales and I have shown in the last few years, we've written a number of articles about this. And this will also be a theme of our forthcoming book. What we've shown is that this, this view is wrong. This conventional wisdom is wrong. And let me just give you an example of this. Let's take ExxonMobil. Exxon has worked to undermine environmental policies to combat global warming. It has financed organizations that cast doubt on climate change. So these are actions that ExxonMobil has taken either in the past or is currently doing, these actions. So these actions may be very profitable for Exxon. Indeed. I'm sure they are. But the question is, is this what Exxon shareholders want? I mean, is Exxon acting in the interests of shareholders by doing these things? I would think almost everybody, perhaps everybody in this room is an Exxon shareholder. I certainly am through an index fund. Right. I don't hold Exxon directly, but I hold ex on through, an S&P 500 index fund. Right. So I'm a very, very small shareholder of Exxon. So is Exxon acting in my interest or your interest when it's doing these things? Sure. We want to be rich, but we care about other things too. We don't want to live in a hotter world. We don't want our children or grandchildren to live in a hotter world. We may even care about people unrelated to us living in a hotter world because we're somewhat altruistic. Exxon's actions are subverting, these other goals that we have. Exxon, as I say, is claiming to act on our behalf, but it never asks us what it wants. Sorry, what we want. It could and it should. And in an investor, assembly is one way to achieve this. And I will describe exactly how this works in a few minutes. Now, most people these days hold shares in companies through intermediaries. In the case of the US, we have the big three, Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street, and most people are holding, as I say, shares through these intermediaries. These intermediaries engage with companies on our behalf. They vote for boards of directors. They vote on shareholder resolutions or proposals. And most people don't even know that this is going on. And what on what basis do the intermediaries engage with companies? Well, they assume that we want to maximize financial return. In other words, it's the same thing. Profit maximization. Shareholder value maximization is assumed to be what the ultimate shareholders want. The ultimate beneficiaries. But they they never ask us. They could and they should. And they can do that by setting up an investor assembly. So how would this work? I think investor assemblies are particularly powerful at the intermediary level because intermediaries, you know, through intermediaries we hold shares in so many companies. So here's here's how it could work. Blackrock could set up an assembly for its S&P 500 index fund. It would be very similar to the kind of citizens assembly that Alan was talking about. It would randomly select 150 of its investors in the fund. Now, one difference between the corporate context and the civil context is the political context is that in the political context, we all are familiar and we sort of believe in the idea of one person, one vote. But in the investment context, we're more familiar with one share, one vote. So in order to respect that, we propose that someone with more invested in the Blackrock and S&P 500 index fund would have a greater chance of being chosen for the Assembly. But once in the Assembly, it's everyone is the same. It's one person, one vote. Now the members would meet would. Well, I don't think I have to repeat this because Elon has described it very well. They would meet, they would listen to experts. Experts though would be on tap but not on top. And they would again, they would also be, paid, compensated for expenses and all the rest. And another important thing is that they can opt out. So what's going to happen. This investor assembly is going to be pushing Blackrock to vote in certain ways. Well if you're an investor in the S&P 500 fund and you don't like this idea, you can always say, well I don't want to be part of this. I'm going to do my own voting. Okay, so let me give some examples of what, an assembly might be considering. It might, decide about Exxon's lobbying or the lobbying of other oil companies, all oil companies. So the Assembly might decide that Blackrock should be pushing these oil companies to stop lobbying against sensible climate regulation. That would be one thing under consideration. As another example, they might be considering the use of antibiotics in large scale poultry farming. This use contributes to antibiotic resistance, which puts human lives at risk. So the Assembly might be telling Blackrock please stop encourage companies to stop doing this. Or to give another example, which is extremely topical, I just read about I've been reading about it in the New York Times in the last few days. Uber, and, you know, there's a serious concern about passengers in, in on Uber rides being sexually assaulted. And I just read today that the New York State Comptroller is actually leading a shareholder push, of Uber to try to get Uber to do something about this. Well, this is something that the Blackrock Assembly could also decide. They could be saying to Blackrock, please push Uber to do something about this, profit. Profit maximization is not delivering the right outcome. Okay. Let me conclude. Let me wrap up. So companies do many good things. We believe that, in fact, most of the things companies do companies do are probably good, but they also do some bad things. And often they do these bad things in the name of profit maximization and in, in the name of acting on behalf of the company shareholders. Well, there's no reason to think that's right. At the very least, the shareholders should be asked. Maybe they would say, just do it. It's great. In fact, do more of it. We we we really care about the money. I don't know, it's like democracy. You never know what's going to come out of it. It's not always exactly what you want, but, I think we believe that democracy is generally a good system, and for some reason it's not applied in the company context. So we think it should be. And shareholder assemblies or investor assemblies are one way to achieve this. Thank you very much.
Okay. All right. We're just going to wait to have our chairs put on stage. And then we're going to have a discussion. Excellent. There we go. Okay. Maybe I might go sit in that corner there. Right. Please be seated.
Yes.
Oliver and Ellen, that was a masterclass. I feel like, this was brain fodder, in that you really made me think. And I'm sure everyone else here and watching around the world, you made us really think about the nature of democracy, what it would take to make it better and more effective with better outcomes. And, Oliver, you really made us think about how companies actually work and what is the true meaning of shareholder value, how to define that. I'm going to put a couple of questions to you both, and then I'd love to open this up in the spirit of this discussion. Ellen, if I may, I'm going to point out a couple of things that people would say as a refutation to your thesis. And I just want you to refute my refutation, as it were. One is that, you know, in the real world, governments have to make really complicated decisions about economic policy and foreign policy, and that the only people who can make these decisions are true experts who've spent a lifetime in the weeds dealing with all of these issues, and that ordinary citizens may not be able to grasp all the complexities, and that they may end up with worse outcomes. That's one part of my question. And the second part of it is what you're describing in theory. It sounds great. Has it ever been used anywhere in the world?
Okay, well, if it's true that only experts have the answer, then why do we have elected politicians make the decisions right there in no better position than the randomly selected citizens than proposing to kind of replace them with or augment them with? The reality is that, of course, you need experts. The question is, do they get to decide or do they get to inform the decision? And I think it makes a very big difference to the outcome. I'll give you an example. If you think like an expert, if you think like a technocrat, how do you solve the, you know, crisis around pension reforms in France? Well, you do it President Macron's way. You just raise the age limit and that's it. And you don't want to discuss with anyone. You ignore the protesters. You don't want to talk to any, you know, unions you force. It backfires big time.
It didn't.
Work out. If you think politically, you listen to the different parties. You. But you also should have done a citizens assembly on the pension reform. And you will understand that the problem is not just mathematical. You know, it's not an accountability problem. It's the meaning of work. It's painful. It's it's it's in fact so painful. People don't want two more years of it. So maybe there's a conversation to be had, not just about the mathematics and the accounting. It's also about, okay, the meaning of work. Can we change things? Can we make it more bearable for people to work longer, stuff like that. And I think that's where the, the user experience of, of the citizens is essential. And I think many governments ignore it and they ignore it in part because they are too removed from from the people they represent. They're a select group who become a class of their own. And and I think I'm trying to re-inject some of the voices.
And just very quickly, citizens assemblies. It's not just a theory. It has been applied in France, for example.
We've done, 18 at the regional level, three at the national level, on climate, on end of life issues. I was actually on the governance committee of the second Assembly, and there was just a third one on school rhythms and a fourth one is coming. So and as I said, there are a thousand examples around the world.
Oliver, let me bring you in. Similarly, I'm going to present to you a classic refutation of the your presentation. And that would be that regular people can't make decisions that companies and people who've spent a lifetime dealing with very particular issues uniquely understand. So for example, you mentioned Exxon. You know, to work in the oil industry, you have to have a real understanding of drilling and worker safety and the importance of the price of oil to be within a certain bandwidth. You really need to understand supply and demand. You need to understand global competition. And these are things that a regular person may not be as familiar with. And I take all of Alan's points very well. But again, the the add on refutation is that, you know, a regular citizen, they have day jobs, they focus on other things, and then maybe they get a little bit of time at the end of the day to focus on issues such as, you know, contract law or how to make ExxonMobil work better. There are no replacement for the people who do this 24 over seven. So how do you refute that?
Oh, I'm I think the answer is we're not going to replace the Exxon executives. That's not the idea here. I think, though, these executives, in companies and also the people who work in, at the asset managers, they are, you know, take Larry Fink. I mean, he's a great expert on many things that I know very little about. But the point is, these people were chosen for their, you know, ability at a particular job, not for their ability to make moral choices. And that's what we're talking about here. We're talking about trade offs. So involving money on the one hand and some other goals, some social goal on on the other hand. So in the case of Exxon, you know, it was whether this lobbying should be done. And, you know, you could somebody could come along and say how, how bad some climate regulation would be for Exxon's profitability. I'm thinking now of the Assembly. They could hear an expert who would say how how damaging, how important the lobbying is to protect Exxon's profits, right. On the one hand. And then an expert comes along and talks about, how damaging this, this lobbying campaign and also by the other oil companies is to climate change. And then but at the end of the day, the when you're deciding whether to make the trade off, that's something that I think only, the, the ultimate shareholder, they're in the position to make that. Let me give you another example just very quickly, because I think it really makes it even clearer. Consider a company that is using animals in meat production, and it has to decide whether to be more humane or less humane with the animals. Okay, so an assembly there could hear an expert who would say how much it would cost to treat the animals more humanely. And then another expert would say, how much, how much pain animals feel and how much that would be reduced if the more humane treatment is used. I mean, the sad news is that animals are going to die. Either way, they are going to be killed. So we're taking the question is how and how to, you know, how to reduce the pain. And so an expert would talk about that. And then but then who decides whether then it's worth the cost in terms of the benefit to the animals. That's not something that I think, an executive at Costco is in a good position. I mean, they were never chosen for that, right? It's the shareholders who can make that choice. They're the right people because they pay the cost, actually. Yeah, that's the idea.
And what you're reframing for us here is what is the point of a company and and who has power in deciding what the company does. I want to make sure that we, we get some questions in from the audience here. So I see one hand here. If we could have a mic, we've its way there. Anyone else? We'll take them together. Just tell us your name. And then a question, not a comment. Please go ahead.
Yeah. Hi, everybody. I'm Ishan Pratap Singh. I'm 22 years old. I'm from the Global Shapers New Delhi hub. My question is, so, professor, not based on expertise, but based on time and energy. You put your money in an index fund because either you don't have the time or the interest in directly judging Exxon, reading the reports, and then figuring out whether it's a worthy investment or not so somebody else does it for you. So in this system with citizen assemblies, because government is such an evolving process and it will be on multiple federal levels, I guess, why will we be able to get citizens to contribute that time? Because the assumption is that we don't like, for instance, I want something to be done in climate, but I don't want I don't have the time to do it myself. So even if I were chosen as a regular person to be on that assembly, I wouldn't be able to give that time. Just like, for instance, you wouldn't be able to give the time as an investor to actually go through the whole process of judging, Exxon as an investor. So government in itself, isn't that like just an index fund for us to, put our priorities in and then they can worry about how to do it on a daily basis?
Okay. So that is well taken. If we can just ruminate on that. I'm going to take one more question, and then I'll let you both respond to one or both of them. Yes, please.
My name is I am a normal citizen and I'm interested in the political context on the costs. Because I live, I'm French, I live in Germany, and they are in the city. I live a lot of of, different forms of citizen engagement. And I was talking to the mayor and he was saying, this is a lot of time and effort. So I'd love to hear about comments. Maybe there are some people interested how to do this and what is it in terms of cost and effort? Because democracy needs that. But it is a cost and effort. Thank you.
Okay. Which of you would like to jump in first? Oliver?
Okay. So, I mean, two two responses to that. The first thing is that one of the reasons we don't spend a lot of time thinking about our investments is because of, you know, the free rider problem when it comes to, deciding how to vote on. Well, first of all, by the way, we because we invest through intermediaries, we don't they vote for us. So but even if you were a direct Exxon shareholder, you might decide you're not going to spend a lot of time thinking about Exxon, because any thought you put into it, you know, it's going to lead to you voting in some way on a shareholder proposal. What are the chances that your vote will make any difference? Zero. So it's quite rational for you to not spend your time doing that. In contrast, if you are invited to be on Exxon Investor Assembly as one of 150 people, well, now what you're doing can actually make a difference. So your attitude could be, very, very, very different. The other thing you were sort of hinting or suggesting was, well, why don't we rely on government? Isn't that what governments for? The trouble is? My excellent example is a good one for this, because they're actually getting in the way of government. They're actually through their lobbying campaign contributions. They're actually preventing government doing its job. The best way for us to to, deal with that problem is actually from the bottom up to get Exxon to stop doing it, stop interfering with the political system. So then we can have government do its thing.
And then.
So the actual cost of citizens assemblies, I'll tell you that the Rolls Royce of citizens assemblies, the climate convention in France in 20 1920 was about €6 million. Sounds like a lot. It was a distributed over nine months, eight weekends in the center of Paris, you know, put up in nice hotels, etc., etc., flown from overseas territories, etc. so it seems like a lot. But compared to what the cost of elections is ballooning, it's in the billions in the US and I would say we shouldn't focus on that question right now. I think the question is what's the cost of not doing it? The cost of not doing it is potentially throwing us in the arms of populists and demagogues and authoritarian politicians. And then the benefits, I think some of them are hard to measure, but but in terms of reconciling citizens with each other, giving them a sense of purpose, a dignity, a sense of being heard, which in a way helps me also address a little bit the question that was posed to Oliver. Why would people take the time to do this? Well, some of them will. If you invite enough people, you know, some of them will. And when they come, they're usually eager to stay and continue. They come for the some of them come for the money. You know, it's, some people just get paid a minimum wage. And that's something that adds up to quite quickly over several weekends. So they come for the money, but they stay for the friendship. They stay for the experience they put up in Paris where they might have never been. They get to talk to people they would never talk to. They get to meet politicians. They get to meet experts. They get to have an education in the process for free. So I think there's a lot of benefits that come with those things. We shouldn't just focus on the cost.
I know we're out of time, but I'm just going to ask one last question. Oliver. And if I may, I'll come to you on this. You know, one immediate reaction that I think many people will have to both of your ideas is feasibility. And in the case of a lens presentation, there actually are real world examples of citizens assemblies working. And they are ongoing in many countries now, with your presentation, it strikes me that, I mean, money and power have always been the two things that no one who has them wants to give them up. And in your case, in the case of your thesis, why would the people truly in power in any of these companies, why would they ever go along with what you are proposing?
Okay. Well, first of all, this is I'm glad you asked this because it turns out this although there are many more examples in the political context, there's there are two examples of an investor assembly in, of an investor assembly. So one involved a Dutch pension fund, and there's one happening right now. Emmeline Cooper, who's a British woman, is doing these things both in the Netherlands. She did, and she's doing it with a major UK pension fund. So somehow they saw the light. They decided, you know what? We want to hear what our beneficiaries think. I would love Larry Fink. I would love to meet him one on one. He's extremely busy. I can see that. But, you know, I would. He seems like a very reasonable person and also extremely smart. I think he might actually, realize the idea's a good one. But there's another thing. There's another important thing, which is that the big three are under tremendous political pressure for having too much power. This is the problem. They have a lot of power because they have about 25% collectively in every American company. And they vote and wait a minute and they get attacked from the right and the left, either for being too woke or not for being not woke enough.
But I have to point one thing out. And just speaking for Larry here, the first thing that will happen if we go through with your theory is that the Citizens Assembly will say our corporate leaders should not be paid what they're paid. It's way too much. And this would have been the case with politicians. No, no, no it is, it is. I agree this would have been the case with politicians as well. But politicians are not paid very well, with some rare exceptions in Singapore and other places.
They would say that.
But. But you don't think they would say that?
I don't know, I don't, but that's.
I think you would get them to, to talk about it and, you know, have a conversation about whether the compensation level is adequate or not, which we don't have right now.
If you can't convince them that this is the right amount. By the way, I don't this is not the main thing I want them to be discussing because I'm interested in these value values, trade offs. But if they are, if that does come up, I don't see why one couldn't convince them that Elon Musk is getting exactly the right amount. Perhaps too little.
I mean, he he yeah, he I doubt that would happen. But I mean he was willing to go to court over the amount of money he was paid.
But can I just say that they have given up some power because, you know, they've done something. We don't have time for it today. Pass through voting. They are actually saying to their beneficiaries, why don't you do the voting yourselves rather than us doing it? Why are they doing that? Because of the political pressure. They're worried about being broken up because they have too much power. So I think things can change.
Well, much as though our citizens assembly here would love much more, the powers that be at Whef are signaling to me that we we are out of time. So I'm just going to say thank you very much to Oliver and to Ellen for your work in general, and for being here and making the presentations you did. Thank you very much.
Thank you, thank you.